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Variable real exchangeratesinfluence the country choice for location of production
facilities by a multinational enterprise. With risk averse investors and fixed productive factors,
a parent company should not be indifferent to the choice of production capacity location, even
when the expected costs of production are identical across counuies.If a non-negative
correlation exists between real export demand shocks and real exchange rate shocks, the
multinational will optimally locate some of its productive capacity abroad. The share of
production capacity optimally located abroad increases as exchange rate volatility rises and as
export demand shocks become more correlated. These theoretical results are confirmed by
empirical analysis of quarterly United States bilateral foreign-direct-investment flows with
Canada. Japan, and the United Kingdom.
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Theimportance of exchange-rate variabilityfordomestic and international investment flows has
been argued in numerous contexts. In industrialized economies, the presumed effects of exchange-rate
variability have influenced the choice of international monetary regimes. This issue arose in the early
l970s when the Smithsonian Agreement was discussed and again at the time of the Plaza Accord
during the mid-1980s. In the early 1990s.theposited negative implications of variable exchange rates
was one motivating theme in designing the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) operable over
currencies within the European Monetary System(EMS). The currency crises within theERM in
September 1992 and Spring 1993 refocused attention on the rationale for limiting short-term nominal
exchange rate movements and on the validity of arguments that exchange rate variability is costly and
dampens real economic activity.'
To date, much of the analysis on the real effects of variable exchange rates has considered
whether variable exchange rates depress domestic exports and thereby worsen international
competitiveness. Empirical tests over both developed and developing country export data have
reached ambiguous conclusions.2 Other recent discussions of the additional costs of variable exchange
rates center on the expense of: irreversible investment decisions, over-investment in productive
capacity, and exchange-rate-induced incentives for domestic producers to located their manufacturing
facilities outside of the United States. As in the literature on hysteresis in trade [Dixit (1989), Baldwin
and Krugman (1989)]. an important issue is whether waftsiwq movements of exchange rates may lead
to persistent restructuring if not deindustrialization of economies and whether this restnictuiing is
stimulated or reduced when future exchange rates are uncertaist'
In this paper we emphasize and explore the implications of short-term exchange rate variability
for foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. Short term movements of exchange rates about some trend
corresponds to the concept of exchange rate volatility within exchange rate regime discussions. This
'Reductions U, nominal exchange tale variability typically goes together with a Suction in real exchange rate volañlity
SeeMussa (1982)and Dorubuscb (1989).
2Edison and Melvin (1989) provide a critical survey of this literaWre.
'Goldbas (1993) and Campa and Goldberg (1994) finds that seal exchange rare variability is correlated with reduced
thvesent activityU.S.manufacturingseem
1distinction deliberately excludes the longer term volatility measures that would include the persistent
currency realignments pertaining both to flexible and controlled exchange rate regimes. Our main
theoretical result shows that if short-term exchange rate variability is to have a zeal impact on foreign
directinvestment,it will work in the direction of increasing the share of production activity that is
located offshore. Our theoretical proposition is tested using United States bilateral FIN data for the
1978 to 1991 period. The empirical findings supportthemain theoretical results.
The international investmentimplicationsof variable exchange rates, often stated in policy
discussions, have not been the subject of much formal analysis. The theoretical work on this subject is
divided among productionflexibilityarguments and riskaversion arguments.The production
flexibility arguments have been expounded most recently by Aizenman (l992). Aizenman relies on a
production structure wherebyproducers commit todomestic and foreign capacity a ante and commit
to employmentdecisionsex post, following the realization of some stochastic element such as nominal
or real shocks. The theoretical results are an open-economy extension of the earlier literature on
domestic tnvescmenc, wherein the effects of price variability on investment hinge on the sunk costs in
capacity (i.e. the extent of investment in-eversibilities), on the competitive structure of the industry.
and overall on the convexity of the profit function in prices.5 In the production flexibility arguments.
the important presumption is that producers can adjust their use of a flriable factor following the
realization of a stochastic input into profits. Without this variable factor, i.e. under a productive
structure with fixed instead of variable factors, the potentially desirable effects on profits of price
variability6 are dizninishecL
An alternative approach linking exchange-rate variability and investment relies on Tisk aversion
arguments. One treatment of this argument emphasizes that higher exchange-rate variability lowers the
'tn the mranazjonaj context, de Men and van 4cr PIne3 (1987) also have explatd the iaotivC
behind the plant location decisions of a multinational enterprise, arguing that the structure of marginal-cost shocks and
demand elasticities are key determinant of optimal invesunents in domestic and foreign opacity.
'The linkage between investment and price variability has been explored in a distinctkcIirilyaiente4 literature.
Sec Harunan (1972), Abel (1983), Crime (1989), Pindyck (1988) and Caballero (1991).
eThis effect is based on the strength of the Jensen's inequalityargument leading to profit convexity in variable prices.
2certainty equivalent expectedexchange-ratelevel) Thesecertainty equivalent levels are used in the
expectedprofit functions of finns that make investment decisions today in order to realize profits in
future periods)t Alternatively, one could maintain a distinction between the effects of exchange rate
variability and the effects of exchange rate levels by directly modeling the utility of expected profits as
decreasing in its variability. This enables one to examine the significance of multiplicative risk factors
on expected profits. e.g. through both revenues and costs, and to isolate the effects of volatility in
exchange rates versus the level effects. We follow this latter approach in this paper.
These production flexibility versus risk aversion approaches are both important but have merit
under ditTerent circumstances. When considerirg the existence and form of real effects of exchange
rate variability, a clear distinction must be made between short term exchange rate volatility and longer
tenn misalignments of exchange rates. For sufficiently short horizons. cx wife commitments to
capacity and to related factor costs are a more realistic assumption than introducing a model based on
cx post variable factors of production.9 Hence, risk aversion arguments are more convincing than the
production flexibility arguments posed in relation to the effects of short-term exchange rate variability.
For variabihty assessed over longer time horizons, the production flexibility motive provides a more
compelling rationale for lirthng foreign direct investment flows to be variability of exchange nte,s.
In this paper we are concerned with the implications of exchange rate variability as measured
from quarter to quarter or at even higher frequencies, for example over weekly or monthly data. This
is the type of variability implicit in less rigorous discussions of the zeal effects of exchange rate
movements. Thus, our theoretical exposition relies heavily on arguments based on aversion to the
volatility of profits: production flexibility arguments are less appropriate for this type of data
frequency.
75a Cushman (1985, 1988).
'Another recent theoretical argumentaboutthe linkage between exchange-rate movements and Investment is based on
the premise of imperfect capital markets [Froot and Stein (1991)1. In this scuing, exchange rate movements alter the
relative wealth positions of competing International investm. By contrast, the nnplmclz of our paper is oii the foreign
direct wvesunent effectsof [mastexchange ruse variability, instesd of ou coateznptieous exchange rate levels.
9Another explanation is that the technology is such that rapacity is fully utilized.
3In Section II, using a two-period model of the inter-temporal decision-making of a producer, we
demonstrate how current assessments of future exchange-ratevariabilitydetermine the portion of
future market demand to be satisfied by production facilities based in domestic versus foreign
economies.'° This decision is made in the context of multiplicative risk factors, entering both through
revenues and production costs. Due to the emphasis of our model on short run activity, we do not
permit ex postadjustmentof a variable productive factor: producers cannot fire or hire workers the
moment that they observe the realization of the stochastic exchange rate or of demand. With labor
contracts, most factors are quasi-fixed in the production function. In this environment, if the parent
company is risk neutral and if exchange rate movements do not influence expected production costs,
the parent company is indifferent to the tocation of its manufacturing facilities By contrast, if the
parent has even a small degree of risk aversion, the location of production facilities mauers. The actual
division of capacity across borders depends on the distributions of both exchange rate and demand
shocks,andon the correlation between these shocks. If foreign production costs are positively
correlatedwithrevenues from those markets, a portion of productive capacity should be located
abroad.
InSections Luand IVthe theoretical propositions areexaminedempirically using quarterly
bilateral foreign direct investment flows between the United States and the United Kingdom. Canada
and Japan. The estimation interval spans flin 1978 through 1991. The effects on FDI of real
exchange rate variability, real demand shocks and the correlation between exchange rates and demand
shocks are presented. Our main empirical finding is consistent with the theory: exchange rate volatility
does tend to increase the shareofproductive capacity located abroad. Section V summarizes,
compares our findings with those of previous studies, and concludes.'1
'°See also Wolak and Kolscad (1991) who examine the covaranceamong different exchange rates in a patfolio tYPe
"Existingempiricat swdiesby Cuslunan (1985.1988)on pooled UnitS States bilateral FDI ouWow data for the 1963-
1978 period and inflow data icr the penod 1963-1986 concluded that exchange rate variabilityw pthalvely wrehied
with both sets at flows. Bailey and Tavlas (t991), using quarterly data onagpegase zeal direct investment Inflows Cot
1976:1-1986:1, were unable so find any adverse Impact of either exchange raze variability or misalignment.
4Finally, we would like to emphasize that it is not the objective of this paper to survey or test the
meritsofalternative explanations for ED! flows. Our paper asks only when and whether real exchange
rare variabilitymayinfluencethepattern of FDI activity. This emphasis is meant tosupplement andnot
meantto eclipse or diminish the range of important motives for ED! exposited elsewhere.'2 We
focuses purely on the effects of expected volatility of exchange rates, without emphasizing the direct
effects of exchange rates on relative production costs and relative cross-country wealth patterns."
fl, THE MODFL
Our basic model is a two-period one in which a domestic firm produces only for a foreign
market, with a combination of domestic capacity (with output exported) and foreign capacity, sited
with demand.'4 In the first period, the horizontally-integrated multinational decides on and commits to
its capacity in its domestic and foreign plant locations. This investment in capacity represents the
parent company planned sales. The firm chooses productive capacity in both domestic and foreign
locations either to maximize the present discounted stream of expected profits or the utility of those
profits.
In period two, uncertainty in exchange rates and in demand are resolved: domestic and foreign
facilities produce at capacity and take prices that clear the market. Investors repatriate their profits.
Even though capacity is chosen in the first period, payments for investment capacity are made in the
second period when revenues are realized.
Producers face an aggregate inverse demand function in the foreign country, denoted by P(q). In
our model q represents the total production capacity of the multinational as well as (second-period)
'2The 'OLI thuinvirate' (Ethier (1986)1 is based On: I) owneTahip advantages, including patents or management
advantages held by the sowve country; ii) locational advantages, whetein the source or destination country reatisres
motivate international inveszmcnq or iii) internalization advantages wherein it Is awn advantageous for a firm to
transact with its international subsidiarythan togage in arms length market activiSt
"Relative wages axe presented as incentives for EN in the explanations based on lolioaal advantagC. Root and
Stein (1992) argue that wealth effects of exchange rate changes may be the dominant channel for exchange rare level
effects. Klein and Rosengren (1994) find support for the wealth channel on annual data for FDI flows into the United
Stases.
t4The assumption that danesuc rums produce only fcr foreign markets is for heuristic thnplithiy and not required For
ow results. The key iseinent is for foreign demand movements in be more strongly correlated with the exchange rate
than is domestic demand for domestic products.
5output since itwillnever pay to under-utilize capacity. Bymakingall factors of production fixed, we
eUminate theability of the producers to buy, via foreigndirectinvestment,the option of channeling
production cx post to the more profitable location. Domestic and foreign countryvariables are denoted
bydandfrespectively. Thus.q1 and q1 are domestic and foreign output. Let 0 = q,/q define the
fraction of capacity overseas. Clearly 05 05 1.
Foreign demand is subject to random real shocks, denoted by 5 with E(5) = 0. In our model, this
corresponds toverticalmovement in the foreign demand curve. Denote the variance of6bya. The
exchangerate, e.isdefined in terms of domestic currency per unit of foreign exchange, also is subject
to randomshocks. Thus, large e means a weakdomestic currency. We choose units so that the
expected value of the realexchangerate is unity. i.e. E(e)=l, andits varianceis given by a.Thus,we
would expect (and assume) that a <1sinceE(e) =1and e￿0. The correlation coefficient between e
and c is given by p = Cov(e,5)/ where Cov(e.5) = E(eb) = eS?'
Although avariety of factors can explain p. the sign of the correlation between foreign demand
anddomestic real exchange rate shocks, consider the simple examples of foreign monetary and
productivity shocks. An increase in the money supply in the foreign country would increase demand
while raisingforeign prices. With incomplete pass-through of the price changes intothe bilateral
exchimgerate, this leads to a short-term real appreciationof theforeign currency and a real
depreciationofthe domesticcurrency. Underthis scenario, & increases (i.e. it is positive) while ealso
rises,implying a positive value for p. Aitematively,if theforeignmonetary shockleadsto short-term
exchangerate overshooting, thedomestic currency, will appreciate inrealterms and P isnegative.
Foreigndemand shocks also can be causedbyforeignproductivity shocks occurringoutside of the
sectorin which our firm is operating. If the relative price index over foreigngoods is reduced without
a compensating nominal exchange rate adjustment, the domestic currency appreciates in reaJ terms and
apositivepvalue isobserved, Theabsolute size of thesecorrelationscould increasewithwage
rigidities.
"if the dtibuuon oft is highlyskewed, It wouldbe possible (or C >1. We preclude this without loss of genenlity.
6Without loss of generality, we assume that capacity costs are equal to 1 per unit of domestic
outputandequal to e per unit of outputabroad.Thus, eisinterpreted as the ratio of foreign to
domesticproduction costs. Since ours is a short-term model, all production costs are embodied in the
fixedfactor,capacity. Theprofitfunction ofthe producer in period2 is:
it(q1,q,,e.8) =e(P(q)+8)-q—q—eqf (I)
Assessedin period I. the expected profits of the multinational,basedon its capacity choice
across domestic and foreign markets, are:
E(Jt)=q.(P(q)—1+ea)￿O (2)
whereindividual rationalityrequiresexpected profits to be nonnegative. Our first basic result follows
directly from (2):
PropositionI:Whenexchangerate and foreign demand shocks are positively (negatively)
correlated, expected product price is less (more) than expected marginal cost.
Oneinteresting implication of this result is that expected product pricemaybe less than expected
costs under profit-maximizing behavior and without dumping motives. Thus, the dominance of
positively correlated exchange rates and foreign demand shocks could lead to pricing behavior that is
incoriecdy interpretedasrelated to dumping. To relate these types of shocks to investment activities,
we consider two versions of the model: one where the producer is risk-neutra] and one where the
producer is risk averse.
ILl Risk Neutrality
In the case of risk neutrality, the effect of altered aggregate production lewis on total expected
profits is given by:
(3)
andthe first-order conditions for profit maximization axe given by:
P(q)+P'(q).ql— (4)
7The left-hand side of (4)representsexpected marginal revenues whereas the right-hand side
terms represent(constant)marginalcostsadjusted for thecovariancebetween exchange-rateshocks
and foreigndemand shocksforthemultinational product. Our secondresultfollows from (4):
Proposition 2:Ifthe domestic firm is risk neutral and expected production costs are the same in
domestic and foreign markets, then:
a)ifp>O(pcO), marginalcostsexceed (are less than) expected marginalrevenues and total
outputof the multinational expands (shrinks) relative to the deterministic case.
b) The firm is indifferent regarding the location of production facilities.
In this simple two-period model with risk neutrality, the multinational's investment in capacity
today is a function of the correlation between the exchange rate used to value export earnings and the
foreign demand for the multinational's product Under risk neutrality, the total volume of production
may be sensitive to the size and correlations between shocks, butthelocation of production facilities is
notsensitive. The important point to keep in mindis that the stochastic nature of exchange rates and
demandmatteronly to the extent that these shocks are correlated. Without risk aversion, and without
expected relative wage or marginal cost effects across countries, foreign direct invesunent flows will
not be significantly influenced by altered variability of exchange rates.
The correlation between export demand shocks and real exchange rate shocks is important in
Proposition 2 and, in general, will be shown to be an important theoretical detemilnant of the location
ofinvestmentfacilities.
11.2 Risk Averse Produeer.Inyestnn
Suppose that producers are risk-averse)6 Assume that the expected utility of profits can be
written as a function of expected profits and the variance of profits.
'6Dufeyand Srinivasula(1984) review the weabiesses of common arguments against die claim that SUms are risk averse
and that firms should hedgeagainstforeign exchange risk. Thu. riskaversion arisesif wprre management seeks to
avoid default risk anti thecosts offinancial distess, where these costs risewith thevariability c the net cashflowsof
the ibm. Moreover, managers (and shareholders) may be personally heavily exposed to the risk of variable fism ixofits
and thereby would anempi to elimin,t. this risk Rc&iguez (1981) vi4es supporting cviflon management amutandbehavior. Another mon argument *gaint firm risk aversion is based on the Modigliani-Miller
theorem.This theorem implies that whatever the firm can do (in terms of hedge azivlzjes), lnvestrn an do: If exchange
8E(u(7t)) = U(E(it),Var(it)) (5)
Thisexpected utility specification is justified if utility is quadratic or if the uncertainty induced in
profits is normally distributed (Jarrow, 19881.We will assume (e,8)are bivariate nOnnaJ.t7 We also
assume that E(u(x)) is strictly concave, a somewhat stronger assumption. Using the properties of
stochastic exchange rates and demand, the variance of profits is given by:'8
(6)
where8 =q,/q.Using equations (5). (2) and (6),onecan determine the period one inve,sixnerns in
domestic and foreign capacity (actually q and 8) that will maximize investor utility. The goal,
maximizing (5) subject to q ￿ 0.0 ￿ U S 1, and (2), represents a constrained optimization problem.
Consider the case where (2) is non-binding. The first-order conditions depend on whether optimal q
and/or8are at theboundaries.
Assume y=-2U,/U, >0 is constant where U is defined in (5) and the U4 denote the




aE(u(E)) aE()+uavar(E)un (ib) ae ae ao
whereA =P(q)+P'(q)q — —T-Var(n) (lc)
q
(ld)
Fromthe assumed strict concavity of E(z4E)), a constrained maximum of (5) exists, although
of course it may be trivial (4).Thisassumes regularity (strict complementarity) holds. Note that the
riskisto be hedged.it need notbe done bythe film. But,thisargument Is weakened by Impediments to more efficient
hedging by individuals, Includingrum-levelacoess to lower cost hedges and asymmetries woss managers and
shareholders in information about firm'Ievel exposure.
"Note that we stated earlier that E(e$l and eis non-negative. The exchange rate process is assumed centered about one
ratherthanzero. Because ofnormality,E(e5)=paa.E(eba) =2pap5,andE(e282) = 2p2ac+ (I+
'8Equasion(6)is derived by taking the expected value of the squared difference between profits as defined in equation
(I) and expected profits as presented in equation (2).
9first-order conditions at various boundaries differ primarily in the Atennin equation (is).Therefore,
the following results hold:




Thebasic interpretationof thisresultis that, with even a small degree of riskaversion, the
parentcompany is not indifferent to the location of facilities, even whentheexpected unit costs of
production are equal across facilities. Foreign direct investment flows will be influenced by the
expected variability of real exchange rates.
It is important to remember that p,a,,anda5 are exogenous to the firm. Based on these
characteristics of the distributions of the esand8's, the firm chooses q, and q1 (both of which may be
zero). Lemma I leads directly to the following corollary:




Proof: Use equation (8) and equation (2) to derive equation (9).
There are a number of implications of Corollary 1. First,withe and 6 positively correlated.
foreign demand is high precisely when the domestic currency is weak. By locating production facilities
overseas, the producer minimizes the variance of expected profits and increases expected utility. Thus.
the expected utility of profits is maximized by locating all production in the foreign country. Second,
whenthere is only exchange rate uncertainty and no demand uncertainty (or when these shocks are
orthogonal), then it is always desirable to locate some production overseas, i.e. q, >0. This may be
10the case if exchange rates are determined purely by short-term speculation in financial markets and are
unrelated to other market fundamentals. Under risk aversion, there alwayswill beproduction located
abroad, in contrast to the risk neutrality case where the location choice is indeterminate. Third, if
demand and exchange rate shocks are modestly negatively correlated it will be desirable to have some
domestic production and not place all of one's capacity offshore.
Corollary 1 also states that when specific patterns in domestic and foreign invesunent activity
are observed, there are relationships between exchange rate and foreign demand shocks that must be
satisfied. For example, if no capacity is located offshore, exchange rates and foreign demand shocks
must be negatively correlated, If there is at least some capacity sourced at home, then these shocks
must be positively correlated.
11.3 Comparative Statics:
Having defined the condition for optimal choice of q and q1, we now turn to the question of
how these optimal choices are affected by the scale of the uncertainty in exchange razes and demand
and by the covariance structure between these shocks.
Proposition 3: Assume a: an optimal q. that q, q1 >0. Then:
'—>0 '—<0 (10) aa
gf: See Technical Appendix.
This resultstatesthat the greater the vasiability of exchange rates, the larger the share of
capacity located offshore,althoughoverallcapacitydeclines. Wecannotconcludewhether ornot the
absolute level ofFDIrises or falls. Implicit in this proposition is the fact that exchange rate and
demand shocks are negativelycorrelated(from Corollary 1); otherwise q, =0. This is somewhatas
expected since only profits as opposed to the entire price are exposed to exchange rate fluctuations
with foreign investment, Furthercomparativestatics results emergewithsome xesu'ictions on the form
of the demand function:
11Proposition 4: Assume at an optimal q, that q .q, >0. Further assume that demand is nor
excessively convex, i.e. P (q)+ P'(q)q COforall q>O. Then:
i>o (11)
ap
£WQI: See Technical Appendix.
Byassumptionp<0 from Corollaiy 1. A negativep means that foreign demand is high (C is
large) precisely when the domestic currency is strong. But, as this relationship erodes by p becoming
larger, we move closer to the region of p >0 where all production is foreign. Thus, as p rises. 0 rises.
When 0<9<1, an increase in exchange rate variability which would otherwise tend to increase the
share of foreign investment can be offset by an increase in the absolute value of the covariance
between demand shocks and exchange rate shocks.
11.4 TstabIe Implications
Our model of the implications of real exchange rate variability yields clear predictions for bilateral
flows of foreign direct investment under fixed productive factors. Under risk neutrality. EDT share is
not expected to be correlated with variability measures. By contrast, with just a small degree of risk
aversion and if p ￿ 0: positive ED! always occurs (Corollary 1). This share of total capacity located
abroad would be unresponsive to exchange rate variability in this regimeonly tall capacity already is
located on foreign soil. With the share of ED! in total invesunent bounded away from zero and one
and p ￿ 0, the FDI share increases as exchange rate variability rises (Proposition 2). Furthermore, as
long as demand is not excessively convex, the ED! share increases as the correlation between exchange
rate and real demand shocks rises (Proposition 3).
Defining a source country by the index i and a destination market by the index), these theoretical
propositions give rise to the following testing equation:
= Pt ÷$°h +p;p+e! +y/ +4 (12)
where the share of production capacity from the source county i located in the destination countiyj is
a (unction of: (i) the volatility of the bilateral zeal exchange rate, L. which is expected to enter with
12a positive coefficient ,;(ii) the volatility of real destination market demand, CL. for which the
coefficient 5,isambiguously signed; (iii) the correlation between the real exchange rate and zeal
destination market demand, p, whichisexpected to enter with a positive coefficient j3,; and (iv) the
real exchange rate e,u, which is expected to enter with a negative coefficient 5.Destinationmarket
demand, gdp,',alsois included as an explanatory variable in this equation although thesign and
significance is not determined in our model.2°
m.THEDATA
Thesetheoretical predictions are tested using bilateral foreign direct investmentactivity between
the United States and the United Kingdom. Japan and Canada Thecountzy choices for bilateral
partners is partially motivated by data availability and partially motivated by the importance of these
countries to the United States in foreign-direct-investment flows.
Ourmodel treatsforeign-direct-investment as total investment or capacity location choice bythe
parent in a subsidiaiy at any point intime.We use flow data on bilateral investments, with the foreign
direct investment data drawn from United States balance-of-payments tables. For inflows intothe
United States, these data capture the increase in the book value of equity in United Statesbusinesses
or asset deemed under foreign control held by foreign persons. An analogous definitionapplies to
outflows originating in the United States and invested abroad.2' Oursample period begins in 1978 in
order to minimize estimation problems stemming from the majorstep-up in the early 1970s of interest
in the United States as a target for foreign investment ECaves (1989)]. The dataare quarterly, from
1978:1 through 1991:IV and are hilly documented in the appendix. Tosummarize, FDI (q°)isfrom
the Survey of Current Business; total levels of investment (q1) are fromcountry specific sources;
19Assuming some zisk aversion.
t0Wedo not conuol [a- changes in tax laws, which have not beai bmW to be significant determinants of real bilateral
EDt flows of the United States. See Slemrod (1989) on US inward bilateral FDI flowt Klein andRosengren (1994) had
consistent f1ndings tax changes did not alter the pattern of exthange rate level tis on bilateral investments.We also
do not examine the importance of avoiding nade restrictions through FDL or ofamy bathers to inflows of FDI, as in
the analysis of inward Jamnese flows by Lawrence (1993)..
'5These balance-of-payments data are sut4ect to a well-kiowashortcoming: reinvested earnings of foreign subsidiaries.
as invested wealth by the parent, are not appropriately measured. This tanission is more ofa problem in the late 19lOs
than in the 1980s, when reinvested earnings were a much smaller portion of bilateraleqnity positions ILipsey (l992)J.
13bilateral exchange rates and GD? are from the internationalFinancial Statistics (IMF),and the
consumer price indices are CPI data drawn from the OECD.
Constructionof FDI Shares Theshares 8 are constructed by dividing the FDI outflows from a
source country to a destination market by a measure of investment activity in the source country. The
two-way bilateral flows are between the United States and Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom.
While this measure captures the flavor of our model, there are limitations in this data. The theory
considers movements in FDI relative to domestic investment, However,for thesepurposes the
appropriate measure of domestic investment is not aggregate source country investment but instead is
investment in the total new capacity of export-oriented production Linus. Unfortunately this measure is
unavailable. The second shortcoming of our data is that the foreign direct investment data miss
important forms of reinvestment of earnings and tend to understate total foreign investment.
Volatilityandcorrelation measures: For each of the bilateral real exchange rates e' used, both the
levels and distributions of each real exchange rate are constructed (torn the vantage point of the
respective source countries. Exchange rate volatility is constructed as the standard deviation of the
exchange rate over rolling samples of twelve quarters of data, prior to and inclusive of each period t.
normalized by the mean level of the exchange rate within the intervaL This measurea incorporates
both the predictable" and unpredictable" components of exchange rate movements, It is particularly
informative when exchange rates are close to random walks. An analogous procedures also is used to
construct a proxy for real demand variability for each destination country, aj, and for the correlation
between, the real exchange rates and real GD? series, p.
The USS/Can$ real exchange rates exhibited the smallest amount of variability, at roughly one
third the size of the dollar/yen and dollar/pound levels. The variability of the dolladyen exchange rates
increased signiuicandy in the 1985 to 1990 period as compared with levels in 1978 to 1984. Negative
p' (correlations between exchange rates and foreign real GDP) generally are observed from the
Japanese perspective for its assessment of the United States as a destination country for investments
22Wc normalize because the theoretjcaj model assumes no Shift OYU time in the expected exchange rate.
14and for Japanese products.23 Such negative correlations also are observed from the perspectives of the
UnitedKingdomand Canada in assessing flows to the United States in thesecond half ofthe 1980s.
The United States flows to Canada were primarily under a regime of negative correlations in the tate
1970s and early 1980s. This could suggest that monetary shocks in the United States markets or
possibly fiscal shocks in foreign markets were dominant during this period.
StoilonarityPropertiesof the Data: We have conducted augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests over
the data used in the empirical work. Non-stationarity is rejected for all ratios constructed for ED!
activity with the exception of the shares of United States investment into Japan and into the United
Kingdom. For real FIJI series (the nominal series deflated by the home price index), the oniy series for
which we cannot reject the existence of a unit root is real FIJI of Japan into the United States.2'
With the possible exception of the exchange rate and GDP series, we do not have unit root
problems for the right hand side (RI-IS) variables included in regressions forbilateraloutflows from the
United States or inflows into the United States from Canada. However, inflows into the United States
from Japanandfrom the United Kingdom may be nonstationaxy series. Regression inference is. of
course, complicated by the observation that stationary series should not be regressed against
nonstatioaaiy series. However, our conclusions regarding which series are nonstation!zy are biased in
favor of not rejecting unit roots. Thus, 'we account for the possibility the ADF tests yield incon'ect
results by following regression procedures suggested by Stock (1992): those right band side variables
that may have unit roots are entered both in level and first difference format into the regressions.
Dependent variables that may have unit roots alternatively enter in level and first difference format
231ta is interesting when considered in the context cj Pcositioo 1. pcall that ose interpretatiai of Proposition I Is
that the existence of positivecorrelationsbetween exdiange rain and fitgn demand shocks may Inappiopriately lead
to dumping charges. Since the Japanese observe negative carelations, ow unodet does not suggest that evidence
provided in support of dumping charges would be misconstrued.
2'See the appendix icr results orthesetests
The ADF test isbeingapptied to small samples, genesifly 52 obsavadons. and, as shown by Stock (1992)isbiased
against rejection of unit roots in the data
15IV. RESULTSOF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The implications of exchange rate and demand patterns fortheshare of investment activity
located overseas are reported in Table I. For each of the bilateral investment shares we also tested
whether the FDI shares responded differentially to the volatility measures across regions of positive
and negative correlations between demand shocks and real exchange rate shocks, If there was a
differential response across positive versus negative correlations, the regressionresultsaxe reported?6
Exchange rate variability had a positive and statistically significant effect on four of the six
bilateral PD! shares: real exchange rare variability increased the share of total United States investment
capacity located in Canada and in Japan, and increased the share of Canadian and United Kingdom
investment located in the United States. These results are consistent with the predictions of
Proposition 3. However, in contrast to the conditions highlighted in the theoretical propositions, we
did not find evidence that the effects of real exchange rate volatility on investment significantly differed
across periods when there were positive and negative correlations between exchange rate and demand
shocks. Of the remaining two sets of regressions where real exchange rate variability was not
statistically significant, the regressions on shares of FDI relative to total source countiy investment
were subject to some econometric problems. Japanese PD! shares into the United States is potentially
a nonstationanj series and first differences of this dependent variable were used in the regressions. The
regression for United States PD! share into the United Kingdom was subject to problems of
heteroskedasticity and corrected using a Newey-West procedure. Thus, exchange rate variability
enters with the expected sign and was statistically significant except when problems arose in estimating
the regression equations.
26We also estimated regressions using real PD! kveis rather than FDI shares. Wedonot report these regression results
because they are 1101 directiy related ic the theoretical propositions provided in Seaioa U. However, what relevant and
informative we note these results in the texL In all of the OIS regressions pafonned, the regressions contain seasonal
dummy variables and serial correlation ndjussmntts. The a,eftiriaza on aritaegressive and seasonal terms art lbs
reported in the summary tables but are available upon requesL Where appropriate, beteroskedasticity and serial
Correlation problems nit corrected using Newey-West procedures. The models wan diosen basedOfl the Btt*isch
Godfrey test fir serial correlabon, various versions of White's test fir betaoskedastidry, and an ARCH testfour lags.
If the models passed all of these tests, their inference is accqted. If not, the models were estimatedby a 0MM procedure
with a Newey-West correction forserialcorrelation, If required, the regression equation is modified to account
nonstationarities by also entering We potentially first order integrated series into the regressions in first differencet
16Table 1: FDI Outflows as a Share of Source Country Investment
=p, +O +p1 +e +y1 +j4













































































































































































































a/ firstdifference of the dependent variable. S"'rd en-on reporteu below parameter estimates.
P indicates a dummy variable for periods withp> 0. £ indicates the first difference of anriablt
Constants, seasons! dummy variables and AR and MA adjustments are not reported.
denotessignificance at the 5% level; "denotes significanceat the 10% level.
+indicatesthat theNewsyWest procedure was applied.
17Proposition 4 stated that, under particular iesu'ictions aboutthestructure of demand, an
increase in the covariance between destination market demand shocks and real exchange rate shocks
would lead to an increase in the FDI share. l'his direction of response is supported for all data on
levthofoutflows of FDI from the United States and for Canadian EDI into the United States.
However, the results were statistically distinct from zero only for two of the six bilateral flow shares.
Thelack of statistical significance on four of these six terms may be due to the relatively short testing
period of our regressions. Alternatively, the series may violate the convexity restrictions on the
demand functions stated in Proposition 4,orthere may be nonlinearities or discrete regimes which we
do not examine in the relationship between correlation movements and FDI shares.
Although theory did not yield clear predictions about the effects of variability of destination
market demand, this force was statistically significant only for Japanese investment into the United
States: the higher was United States real GOP volatility, the smaller was the share of Japanese
investment sited in the United States.
Exchange rate levels (and first differences) have been found to be highly significant in previous
empirical studies of real FDI activity tested over annual data. By most theoretical arguments, a
domestic currency depreciation is expected to decrease sourcecounty foreign direct investments
abroad,The basicarguments fall into two camps: either real depreciations raise the relative price of
foreignproductive resourcesor increase the relative competitiveness of foreign competitors bidding
for the sameproductionsite. Note, however, that these arguments apply to levels of FDI and
additional assumptions are required before they pertain to the sharedataon FDI as used in our
regressions.
In our tests using quarterly data, the exchange rate levels entered with theexpected sign in all
regressions: exchange rate depreciations of the source countrycurrency lead to a Suction in
investment flow shares to foreign markets. However, these effectsgenerally were neither large or
statistically significant In part, the weak role of exchange rate levelsmay be attributable to the
potential nonstationarity of quarterly exchange rate series. It alsomay be attributable to a valuation
effect: although the absolute level of FDImay decline in response to a domestic currency depreciation,
18the domestic currency value of that PD! at least partially increases due to the change in the exchange
rate. Our findings are consistent with Lipsey's (1992) interpretation of the potential effects of
exchange rate changes on investment: a depreciation of the domestic currency does make foreign
facilities moreexpensive,and probablyleadsto a reduction in demand for physical investment abroad.
However the overallimpactonthevalueof foreign direct investmentrequires ahigh elasticity of
demandforinvestment assets.Our results suggest that either the quarterlymovementsin exchange
ratelevels donot matterforFDIflows, or theelasticities of investment demand are notlarge enough
so that domestic currencydepreciationsactuallyreduce investment flowsabroad.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has contributed to our understanding of the real effects of variable exchange rates in
several dimensions. First, we have argued that there are two classes of models that link real exchange
rate variability to international investment activity. The first class of model relies on the argument that
producers engage in international investment diversification in order to achieve a post production
flexibility and higher profits in response to shocks. This argument is relevant to the extent that a post
production flexibility is possible within the window of time before the realization of the shocks. This
suggests that the production flexibility argument is less likely to pertain to short term volatility in
exchange rates than to realignments over longer intervals.
Since many of the discussions of the merits of fixed versus flexible exchange rate ieginies
emphasize the implications of short term volatility, the group of arguments based on the risk-taking
characteristics of producers are more likely to be relevant forinvestmentactivity in domestic and
foreign markets. We use a simple model to illustrate the linkage between exchange rate variability and
the decision by multinational producers to locate production facilities on domestic venus foreign
shores. Exchange rate variability is expected to have real effects on the share of domestic investment
resources channeled abroad in a limited set of circumstances. If investors are risk neutral, the modeL
does not predict any statistical relationship between exchange rate volatility and the allocation of
19production facilities between domesticandforeign markets. But, if there is risk aversion among
producers, exchange rate volatility may expand the share of investment resources located offshore.
Our analysis of two-way bilateral foreign directinvestmentflows between the United States, and
Canada,Japan. and the UnitedKingdom yielded empirical results consistent with the theory: exchange
rate volatility tended to stimulate the share of investment activity located on foreign soil. Exchange
ratevolatility didnothave statisticallydifferent effects on investment shares when one distinguishes
between periods where real or monetaryshocksdominateexchangerate activity. Real depreciations
of the source country currency were associated with reduced investment shares to foreign markets, but
these results generally were statistically insignificant in our quarterly data
Although the theoretical work concluded that the share of total investment located abroad may
rise as exchange rate volatility increases, this does not imply that exchange rate volatility depresses
domestic investment activity. In order to conclude that domestic aggregate investment declines, one
must show that the increase in domestic outflows is not offset by a rise in foreign inflows. In the
aggregate United States economy, exchange rate volatility has not had a large contractionary effect on
overall investment (see Goldberg (1993) and Campa and Goldberg (1994)].
These results lead to the conclusion that exchange rate volatility can contribute to the
internationajization of production activity without depressing economic activity in the home market
Thus, it is incorrect to assume that the selection of a flexible exchange rate system will lead to
depressed economic activity, If the lessons drawn from United States investment flows can be viewed
in a broader context, the choice of a controlled exchange rate regime is not clearly associated with a
climate more conducive to economic growth. Even if other studies conclude that exchange rate
volatility depresses export activity, our conclusions are not contradicted: exchange rate volatility can
spur an increase in international capital flows that can substitute for international trade in goods
without depressing overall economic activity.
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where EU=EJU(n)]and x canbep.o,ora5. Cramers rule is applied to dcuennine
as/axanddq/dx Weknow that the kit-hand sidematrixof (A-I) is negative semi-definite, and thus
its determinant is positive, since EU is strictlyconcaveby assumption.Since at an optimum A=B)
(from eq. 7a andlb).and eliminating the minus sign of the right-hand-side vector, the following holds
a(A—ra) a(A—Po)
























The sign of (A-4a) is indeterminate; the sign of the other equations in A-4 follow from Corollazy 1(i.e
p ￿ 0). Lemma 1. and the proposition assumptions. Only dO/dx for x =acan be definitively signed.
Proof ofProoosition3: Using theabovenotation it is easy to demonstrate that and<0.
Sincep 0, this implies aS cO which impliesa
23Table Al: Data Sources
Forei2nDirect Investment Series
-
q9: Bilateral foreign direct investment flows between the United States and Canada.
Japan.andthe United Kingdom. Source: TheSurvey of Current Business.
Country Investment Series
q1:Aggregate investmentby eachcountiy i are non-seasonally adjusted dat&
United States: Non-Residential Fixed Investment, source: the Nationalincome and
ProductAccounts.Lb
Japan:Gross FixedCapitalFormation, source: Economic Planning Agency (of Japan).
United Kingdom: GrossFixedCapital Formation,source: Cental StatisticalOffice, data
reported in EconomicTrends 1992 Supplement
Canada:Gross Fixed Capital Formation.
Bilateral Exchan2e Rates
Each bilateral real exchange rate is defined as the productof thesource county nominal
bilateral exchange rate multiplied bythe destinationcountry price index and divided by the
source country priceindex.Thenominal exchange-ratedata are from the international
Financial 5t4stjcs (IMF)andtheprice indices amCPI data drawn from the OECD.
Real GDP
Nominal(MWfor each countryi, deflatedby the respectiveCR!series,with data drawn
from theinternationalFinancial Statistics (IMF) andtheOECD, respectively.
tThe quarterly data are from Unfted States International Transactions Tables", by the United States
Department of Commerce. The series are 'Private Foreign Direct tnveslrnait into the United States' and
United States Direct Invesmwnc. Private Assets Abroad'.
b:We have also conducted all of the regression analysis using a snin.ttw at domestic invesent
net of total net foreign direct investment inflows, in order to adjust icr the foreign sotate Investment
included In the total domestic investment mensures. None of ow results are significantly altered by this
atljustmnent, so we report only the results usng total investment in the denominator.

















































numben in parentheses reflect. respecuwly, the share o(p -CO out of a total o(28 observations in the
1978 to 1984 sample and 24 observations In the 1985 to 1991 sample.
25Tablep-values from AugmentedDickey Fuller tests for Unit Roots.
A3 Testsperformed using constant&notrend(c),constantand trend (t),neitherconstant or




































































































The p-valuesreportedcorrespond to the highest probability of a unit root over the range of tests
performed using theconstant andtrend, constant and no trend, and neither constant or trend, and at
variouslag lengths.In this way,wehave a conservative assessment of unit root telethons.
26